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JUSTICE SCALIA: STANDING, ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW, AND THE SUPREME COURT
Michael A. Perino*

I. INTRODUCTION

President Reagan's appointmeni of Antonin Scalia to the United
States Supreme Court raises concern among liberals that Justice
Scalia will help lead the Court away from a number of liberal positions toward a new conservatism.' The Reagan Administration's
requirement that judicial appointments advance the Administration's
preference for judicial restraint and strict constructionism enhances
this concern. 2 These new executive requirements mean that federal
courts should accord greater authority to the democratically elected
branches of the government3 Justice Scalia's primary areas of study,
administrative law and separation of powers, reflect his adherence
4
to judicial self-restraint.
One aspect of administrative law and separation of powers that
could have a great negative influence on environmental litigation is
the doctrine of standing, especially as standing relates to obtaining
judicial review of administrative decisions. Scalia has advocated a
position on standing that could severely limit the ability of litigants
to obtain judicial review where they allege an environmental injury.
*

Executive Editor, 1987-1988, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW RE-

VIEW.
I See

Chapple & Kraus, Rehnquist-ScaliaCombined Effect May FarExceed Current Pre-

dictions, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 15, 1986, at 24, col. 1.
2 See Chief Justice Burger to Retire From Supreme Court; Reagan Nominates Rehnquist
as Successor, Scalia to Fill Vacancy, 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) at 217 (June 6, 1986). See also
Boyd, Bork Pickedfor High Court;Reagan Cites his 'Restraint';ConfirmationFight Looms,
N.Y. Times, July 2, 1987, at 1, col. 6.
3 See R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 208 (1985).
4 See Two Nominees, One Philosophy, Nat'l L.J., June 6, 1986, at 15, col. 1.
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This Comment focuses on the possibility that Scalia will be able
to erect a stricter standing doctrine inimical to environmental interests. Section II examines the doctrine of standing and the favored
position that courts have granted environmental litigants. In Section
III, this Comment discusses how Scalia, at least theoretically, is
opposed to such a favored position for environmental litigants. Section IV analyzes Scalia's position on standing as manifested in his
opinions on the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Finally, this
Comment concludes by discussing how these factors, combined with
Scalia's philosophy of judicial self-restraint, illuminate the possible
position Scalia will take in environmental cases that come before the
-Supreme Court.
The overall purpose of this Comment is to examine both Scalia's
theoretical writings and his judicial opinions to explore how the
practicalities of judicial decisionmaking have modified Scalia's scholarly positions. In this manner, the Comment explores the tensions
inherent between the twin roles of scholar and jurist. In conjunction
with this analysis, this Comment also examines how Scalia is still
able to advance his theoretical and philosophical beliefs concerning
judicial self-restraint. In this way, this Comment highlights what
factors go into Scalia's decisionmaking. This Comment thus provides
a framework for analyzing how Scalia will approach particular cases
that come before the Supreme Court.
II.

THE DOCTRINE OF STANDING

Standing concerns whether a plaintiff has a sufficient stake in an
otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that
controversy.5 Standing focuses primarily on the party seeking access
to the courts and only secondarily on the issues that party seeks to
adjudicate. 6 The doctrine of standing derives from article III of the
Constitution, which restricts courts to hearing only cases or controversies. 7 Typically, the question becomes whether the dispute sought
to be litigated "will be presented in an adversary context and in a
form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution."8 Courts
reason that, unless these requirements are met, the issues will not
5Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1972).
6Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968).
7 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. See G. ROBINSON, E. GELLHORN & H. BRUFF, THE ADMAINIS-

TRATIVE PROCESS 207 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter ROBINSON].
8Flast, 392 U.S. at 101.
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be presented with the necessary adverseness that illuminates and
sharpens difficult constitutional issues.9
Although seemingly simple on its face, the doctrine of standing
has been described as "among the most amorphous in the entire
domain of public law."' 10 Standing has been subject to widespread
scholarly criticism." This criticism focuses on the erratic manner in
which the Supreme Court has applied the doctrine.' 2 A number of
commentators argue that the primary reason for the Court's inconsistent application of the standing doctrine is its willingness to let
its view of the merits dictate the result it reaches on the standing
issue.' 3 In other words, the Supreme Court uses standing to achieve
a number of jurisprudential and functional goals that go beyond the
threshold question of the plaintiff's ability to have particular issues
heard. 14 In this manner, the Court has used standing: (1) to avoid
deciding issues it does not want to decide; (2) to allow the Court to
decide issues it wants to decide; (3) to avoid deciding issues that it
believes other branches of government should decide; (4) to reflect
the subjective values the Court assigns to various constitutional and
statutory rights; and (5) to avoid deciding cases where the plaintiff's
claim has little merit.' 5 Such decisionmaking falls under the rubric
9 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
10 J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 69 (1986) (quotingHearings
on S.2097 Before the Subcomm. on ConstitutionalRights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, 498 (1966)).
" Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogate for

Claim for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425 (1974); Berger, Standing to Sue in PublicActions: Is it

a ConstitutionalRequirement?,78 YALE L.J. 816 (1969); Currie, MisunderstandingStanding,
1981 Sup. CT. REV. 41; Nichol, Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U.
PA. L. REV. 635 (1985); Nichol, Causation as a Standing Requirement: The Unprincipled
Use of JudicialRestraint, 69 Ky. L.J. 185 (1980-81); Nichol, Rethinking Standing, 72 CALIF.
L. REV. 68 (1984); Sax, Standing to Sue: A CriticalReview of the Mineral King Decision, 13
NAT. RESOURCES J. 76 (1973); Scott, Standingin the Supreme Court-A FunctionalAnalysis,
86 HARv. L. REV. 645 (1973); Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law,
88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1723-47 (1975).
12 E.g., Nichol, Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, supra note 11, at 635.
13 L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 100 (1985).
14 See Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A FunctionalAnalysis, 86 HARV. L. REV.
645 (1973). See also Brilmayer, The Jurisprudenceof Article III: Perspectives on the "Case
or Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 302 (1979) (arguing that there are three
interrelated policies behind the case or controversy requirement: "the smooth allocation of
power among courts over time; the unfairness of holding later litigants to an adverse judgment
in which they may not have been properly represented; and the importance of placing control
over political processes in the hands of the people most closely involved").

's R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw AND PROCESS 143 (1985)
[hereinafter PIERCE]. See also L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 99-120 (1985); J. VINING,

LEGAL IDENTITY 10 (1978) (referring to this use of standing as "Machiavellian").
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of what can be termed "value-laden decisionmaking." Value-laden
decisionmaking arises where judges allow their philosophic predilictions to influence the results of their standing decisions. The result
of this value-laden decisionmaking is a disjointed standing doctrine
that erects unprincipled exceptions in certain types of cases and yet
provides little barrier to litigation in others.16
The current standing doctrine is thus filled with permutations and
inconsistencies that make any attempt at defining a general rule
difficult. 17 Despite this difficulty, it is possible to outline the framework the Supreme Court uses to analyze standing issues in cases
seeking judicial review of agency action generally, and specifically
environmental cases.
A. Standing to Obtain JudicialReview of Administrative Actions
Courts analyze standing to challenge agency actions under the
two-part approach adopted by the Supreme Court in Association of
Data ProcessingService Organizationsv. Camp.1 3Data Processing
established the modern approach to standing issues. 19 In addition,
Data Processing provided the analytical framework for two major
shifts in the modern standing doctrine: a continued trend toward an
increased liberality of application, 20 and a concentration on the plain21
tiff's claimed injury.
Data Processing concerned a suit by petitioners, who provided
data processing services to businesses, challenging a ruling by the
Comptroller of the Currency permitting banks to make data pro-

16 L.

TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 100 (1985).

17For

a fuller discussion of standing to sue, see 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREA-

TISE §§ 24:1-24:36 (2d ed. 1983); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 79-114 (1978).

Is397 U.S. 150 (1970).
19L. TRIBE, A31ERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 79-80 (1978).
2 Scott, Standing to Sue in the Supreme Court---A FunctionalAnalysis, 86 HARv. L. REV.
645, 646 (1973). Data Processingwas a continuation of the increasingly liberal application of
the standing doctrine begun by the Supreme Court two years earlier in Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83 (1968). Since DataProcessing,however, the Burger Court has backed away from the
extreme liberal approach of Flast and Data Processing. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737
(1984); Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans
United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982). Despite this retrenchment, it is still accurate to refer to the liberalized standing doctrine since standing is still
more liberally applied than in the pre-Flast era. Moreover, standing in environmental cases
has not been subject to the same retrenchment as cases in other areas. See infra text
accompanying notes 69-104.
21See PIERCE, supra note 15, at 142.
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cessing services available to other banks and bank customers. In
holding that the petitioners had standing, the Supreme Court stated
that "[t]he first question is whether the plaintiff alleges that the
challenged action has caused him injury in fact, economic or otherwise, '"2 and the second question is "whether the interest sought to
be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of
interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional
guarantee in question."
The Data Processing Court indicated that the first part of the
test, injury in fact, arises from the "case or controversy" requirement of article III of the Constitution.2 Given this basis in article
III, the Court viewed injury in fact as a limitation that keeps the
judiciary from becoming involved in the process of making and implementing laws. 26 By ensuring that the judiciary can only decide
actual disputes, courts will thus be kept out of debates concerning
the best policy the government should follow on a particular problem.27 Accordingly, judges often state that standing limitations are
necessary to prevent a government by the judiciary.2
In Data Processing, the Court found that the injury sufficient to
confer standing was the possibility that competition from national'
banks in the business of providing data processing services might
entail some future loss of profits for the petitioners. 29 Because two
different parties caused those injuries, the data processors had
standing to sue both. First, the data processing company had standing to sue the bank because the data processing association alleged
30
that the bank was preparing to take some of their customers.
Second, the Court found that the Comptroller had also caused petitioners' injury because the Comptroller's ruling precipitated the
31
above injury.
Implicitly, the Court found injury where the harm had not yet
occurred. 32 While the Comptroller had given banks permission to
2 Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 151. The District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of
standing and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Id.

2

Id. at 152.
Id. at 153.

25

Id. at 151-52 (analyzing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2).

2

2

27

See PIERCE, supra note 15, at 141.
Id. at 141-42.

28 See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188-92 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
2 Data Processing,397 U.S. at 152.

30Id.
31Id.

2See id.
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compete with the data processors, the data processors had not yet
lost any profits or customers.8 3 Thus, the data processors sustained
a sufficient injury in fact without any actual deleterious effects on
their business"4 In a sense, this decision transformed a court's standing analysis from a decision about legally sufficient injuries suffered
into a decision concerning the likelihood that an injury will indeed
occur. The acceptance of such contemplated injuries is consistent
with the trend toward judicial acceptance of more tenuous injuries
as sufficient to invoke standing. 5 DataProcessingthus helped move
the Court toward a more liberal application of the standing requirements.

36

In later decisions, the Court specified the requirements for injury
in fact.3 7 This specification is symptomatic of the increasing focus on
the injury in fact portion of the Data Processingtest. The Court's
later decisions required: (1) that the litigants show that they have
suffered personally some actual or threatened injury;38 (2) that the
injury must be fairly traceable to the alleged illegal conduct of the
defendant; 9 and (3) that the injury must likely be redressed by a
favorable decision. 40 The Court has thus specifically delineated what
is required for injury in fact while leaving zone of interest an amor3 See id.
4 See id.

3 Compare Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 478-79 (1938) (personal or economic
interest is insufficient; standing requires a plaintiff to show that a legal right has been invaded)
with Federal Communications Com'n v. Sander Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 476-77
(1940) (statutory language granting judicial review to "persons aggrieved" by a FCC license
decision included competitors facing potential economic injury from the agency's action).
6 See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978)
(environmental groups and individuals who lived near sites of proposed nuclear power plants
had standing to challenge Price-Anderson Act's limitation of liability in case of a nuclear
accident to $560 million as an unconstitutional taking); United States v. Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973) (group of law students had
standing to challenge Interstate Commerce Commission's approval of railroad surcharge for
transporting scrap materials because it damaged the air they breathed).
See infranotes 38-41.
3 Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979) (individual respondents
had standing as testers to prove that petitioner's discriminatory steering practices documented
by their testing deprived them, as residents of the adversely affected area, of the social and
professional benefits of living in an integrated society).
See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504 (1975) (petitioners did not have standing because
they were unable to show that their inability to purchase housing was due to town's restrictive
zoning practices).
40 Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976) (indigent petitioners
did not have standing because they were unable to show that removal of favorable tax
treatment for hospitals which refused to serve the indigent would result in the availability of
such services from those hospitals).
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phous and unrefined concept. The Supreme Court has referred to
the injury in fact standards as the "irreducible minimum" required
41
by the Constitution.
In addition to this "irreducible minimum" the Court applies a set
of discretionary factors-designated "prudential limitations." These
limitations stem from separation of powers notions about when
courts should or should not intervene in agency actions. 42 These
limitations act as a self-checking device designed to keep the judiciary from usurping functions properly left to other branches of
government. One such prudential limitation is that the Court will
not decide cases in which the harm is merely a "generalized grievance" shared in substantially equal measure by all or by a large class
of citizens. 43 For example, in Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to
Stop the War, the respondents, an association of present and former
members of the Armed Forces Reserve opposing United States
involvement in Vietnam, brought a class action on behalf of all
citizens of the United States. 4 They were challenging the Reserve
membership of Congressmen as violating the Incompatibility Clause
of the Constitution.4 5 In Schlesinger, the Supreme Court held that
respondents had no standing to sue as citizens since the claimed
nonobservance of this clause implicates only a generalized interest
of all citizens in constitutional governance and is thus merely an
abstract injury. 46 Therefore, because the association did not show
actual harm, there was no standing.
The Supreme Court in Schlesinger reasoned that the generalized
grievance limitation was necessary to keep the courts from deciding
abstract questions of wide public significance where other governmental institutions were more competent to address the questions
and where judicial intervention was unnecessary to protect individual rights.47 The Court imposed these limits to keep the judiciary
within their predetermined constitutional role. 48 The problem with
41

Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State,

Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).
4 See ROBINSON, supra note 7, at 210.
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 216-27 (1974).
"Id. at 210-11 & n.1.
5

Id. at 210-11 (The Incompatibility Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2, states that "no

Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a member of either House during

his Continuance in Office.").
46 Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 217. The respondents asserted that the nonobservance of the
clause deprived citizens of the faithful discharge of the legislative duties of reservist members
of Congress. Id.
47
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 499-500.
48 See ROBINSON, supra note 7, at 207.
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these "prudential limitations," however, is that they require judges
to examine closely the underlying claims, or merits, of a case. Such
an in-depth look necessarily focuses the judge's attention on his view
of the claim's validity rather than merely the plaintiff's ability to
assert the claim. This is a further reason why the courts have
reached such widely inconsistent, value-laden results in standing
49
cases.

The second part of the Data Processingtest, the "zone of interest"
test, is statutory. 50 This part refers to whether Congress intended
to allow parties in plaintiff's situation to obtain judicial review.51
This second step has lost much of its vitality in recent years. Scholars
genefally consider the only important question in standing is
whether an alleged injury is sufficient to invoke the court's jurisdiction. 52
This scholarly view of the zone of interests test is based on the
broad reading usually given to congressional intent. Courts read the
"zone of interest" test as recognizing that it is within congressional
discretion, as a matter of policy, to decide who may obtain review
of agency actions.A3 In interpreting a statute under which an agency
operates, courts tend to enlarge the class of people who may protest
an administrative action.5 This expansive interpretation removes a
court's self-imposed "prudential limitations" and limits judicial inquiry to the question of injury in fact. 55 The test thus acknowledges
that Congress can expand the scope of standing up to the constitutional limits. 6 If most congressional grants expand standing up to
49 Compare United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 687-88 (1973) (group had standing to sue because of injury to the air
they breathed) with Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 616-19 (1973) (mother of
illegitimate child denied standing to challenge child support statute that is enforced only in
favor of legitimate children).
50Id. at 153.
61See id.
2See 4 K. DAVIS, ADmINSTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 24:17 (1983); see also Davis, The
Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CH. L. REV. 450 (1970); Stewart, The Reformation of
Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1669, 1723-47 (1975). This view is supported by the
recently decided Clarke v. Securities Industry Ass'n, 107 S. Ct. 750 (1987), where the Supreme
Court gave a very liberal reading to the "zone of interests" test. Scalia recused himself from
the case, id. at 762, because he had participated in the case on the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals and had dissented from that court's finding of standing. See Securities Industry
Ass'n v. Comptroller of the Currency, 758 F.2d 739, 740 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
3PIERCE, supra note 15, at 142.
5DataProcessing, 397 U.S. at 154.
See Warth, 422 U.S. at 501.
See C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3531.13 (1984). Examples of such congressional augmentation are numerous, especially in
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the constitutional limits, then the only question that need be an-

swered is whether a sufficient injury in fact exists.
The "zone of interests" test remains important, however, in the

field of administrative law because it concerns the grant of judicial
review contained in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 57 The

APA was enacted to establish minimum procedural rules for agencies
and to erect a framework for judicial review of agency decisions.On the subject of judicial review, the APA provides that "[a] person

suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected
or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant

statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof."5 9 Although different
commentators interpret this provision in a number of ways, 60 the

general understanding, at the time of its passage, was that the
provision codified the existing legal interest test 6' and also referred
to various statutory standing formulae ("adversely affected or ag62
grieved... within the meaning of a relevant statute").
The Court's decision in DataProcessing,however, expanded that

narrow reading 63 to include all interests potentially affected by
agency actions taken pursuant to a statute.64 The Supreme Court
specifically rejected the Court of Appeals use of the "legal interest"
test.65 The Supreme Court found that the Comptroller's order allowing banks to provide data processing services, standing alone, was
sufficient to render the petitioner/data processing company "aggrieved" and thus capable of challenging the order.66 Therefore, the
the area of environmental interests. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1982); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1982).
- 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982).
58See 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1.6 (1983).
r95 U.S.C. § 702 (1982).
60

Compare 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 24:3 (1983)
STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 931 (1979).

with

BREYER &

61See Federal Communications Comm'n v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
For a discussion of the legal interest test of standing, see J. VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY 20-33
(1978).
6 Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A FunctionalAnalysis, 86 HARV. L. REV. 645,
658 (1973).
6 Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153-54.
64 PIERCE, supra note 15, at 142.
6 Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 152-53. The Court of Appeals had stated that:
[A] plaintiff may challenge alleged illegal competition when as a complainant it
pursues (1) a legal interest by reason of public charter or contract, ... (2) a legal
interest by reason of statutory protection, . . . or (3)a "public interest" in which
Congress has recognized the need for review of administrative action and plaintiff is
significantly involved to have standing to represent the public.
Association of Data Processing Service Orgs. v. Camp, 406 F.2d 837, 842-43 (8th Cir. 1969).
66 DataProcessing, 397 U.S. at 157.
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"zone of interests" test apparently restricts almost nothing.6 7 The
test has thus greatly liberalized standing requirements and focused
both the Court's and the commentator's attention on the injury in
fact requirement. 8 Both of these major shifts in standing, the general increased liberality in its application, and the focus on injury in
fact, have been most visible in environmental litigation.
B. Standing in Environmental Litigation
Standing in environmental litigation follows the same basic analysis used in all standing questions. 69 The major difference lies in the
comparatively slight showing courts require for plaintiffs to obtain
standing in cases involving environmental issues.70 In each area of
the standing analysis, the Supreme Court has been willing to lessen
the typical standing requirements. Thus, in environmental cases, the
Supreme Court has readily found a congressional grant of standing
to displace its own prudential limitations concerning such factors as
the widespread nature of the injury. Consequently, the favored position of environmental law in standing questions has greatly promoted environmental interests and also helped to liberalize standing
generally.
1. Injury in Fact Requirement
Deferential judicial behavior toward environm'ental litigation is
evident from the relaxed injury in fact requirements in United States
7
v. Students ChallengingRegulatory Agency Procedures(SCRAP). 1
The plaintiffs in SCRAP were an unincorporated group of five law
students who challenged an Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)
approval of a railroad rate increase that placed a surcharge on the
6See

4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 22:00 (1978).

6" See, e.g., Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl.

Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418
U.S. 208 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); United States v. Students
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Nichol, Rethinking Standing, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 68 (1984);
Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 173447 (1975).
"See supra text accompanying notes 5-68.

70Professor Rodgers has noted that "[iln the space of a few years the question of standing
in environmental litigation has shifted from a significant doctrinal barrier to a nettlesome
technicality." W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 23 (1977).
71 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
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carrying of scrap materials.7 2 The SCRAP plaintiffs asserted that
this rate structure promoted the use of raw materials over recycled

materials, thereby increasing pollution and injuring them as users
of the natural environment and breathers of the country's air.73 The

Court found that this was an injury sufficient to support SCRAP's
suit under the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA).7 4

SCRAP illustrates a number of the significant differences between
standing in environmental law and standing in other litigation. First,
in SCRAP, the Supreme Court was not disturbed by the widespread

impact of the alleged injury. 75 In fact, the Court specifically found
that "all persons who utilize the scenic resources of the country, and
indeed all who breathe its air, could claim harm similar to that
alleged by the environmental groups here. 7 6 The Court in SCRAP

was not concerned with interfering in areas that should be left to
the political branches of government under a system of separation
of powers (in this case, Congress' properly delegated power to the
77

EPA).

SCRAP also shows the Supreme Court's willingness to find a

congressional grant of standing. 7 In an emphatic footnote, the Court
dismissed any question of whether SCRAP's injury fell within the
7 Id. at 678. The ICC approved a rate structure which placed a 2.5% surcharge on scrap
materials thus contributing to the increased cost of using such materials. Id. at 676.
The complete description of the Supreme Court's finding of SCRAP's injury in fact is as
follows:
It [SCRAP] claimed that each of its members "suffered economic, recreational and
aesthetic harm directly as a result of the adverse environmental impact of the railroad
freight structure, as modified by the Commission's actions to date in Ex Parte281."
Specifically, SCRAP alleged that each of its members was caused to pay more for
finished products, that each of its members "[u]ses the forests, rivers, streams,
mountains, and other natural resources surrounding the Washington Metropolitan
area and at his legal residence, for camping, hiking, fishing, sightseeing, and other
recreational [and] aesthetic purposes," and that these uses have been adversely
affected by the increased freight rates, that each of its members breathes the air
within the Washington metropolitan area and the area of his legal residence and that
this air has suffered increased pollution caused by the modified rate structure, and
that each member has been forced to pay increased taxes because of the sums which
must be expended to dispose of otherwise reusable waste materials.
Id. at 678.
74SCRAP alleged that the ICC decision to maintain the surcharge was unlawful because
the ICC failed to include a detailed environmental impact statement as required by the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2)(c). SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 679.
5
SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 687.
76Id. (emphasis added).
77But see Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984); Logan, Standing to Sue: A Proposed
Separationof Powers Analysis, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 37; Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as
an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SuFFoLK U.L. REV. 881 (1983).
- SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 686 n.13.

ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS

[Vol. 15:135

"zone of interests" of NEPA. 79 Thus, SCRAP illustrates the Court's
readiness to accept a small injury as sufficient to confer standing in
environmental cases.8 0
2. Causation Requirement
The Court has also shown a willingness to de-emphasize the causation element of standing for environmental litigation. 8' In Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 2 the
plaintiffs, two environmental groups and 40 individuals who lived
near the sites of two proposed nuclear power plants, challenged the
Price-Anderson Act's constitutionality. 3 Plaintiffs claimed that the
Act, which limits liability in the case of a nuclear accident to $560
million, deprived them of their property rights without due process
of law, because they could not obtain full compensation if there were
a nuclear accident. 4
In Duke, the Court found an actual injury in two effects of the
nuclear plants' operation: (1) the environmental and aesthetic consequences of the thermal pollution of two lakes in the vicinity of the
disputed plants; and (2) the emission of non-natural radiation." The
Court based this second finding on the "generalized concern about
exposure to radiation and the apprehension flowing from the uncertainty about the health and genetic consequences of even small emissions like those concededly emitted by nuclear power plants. 86 What
makes this finding interesting, beyond the very slight and somewhat
speculative harm involved, is that there appears to be no close
relation, or "nexus,"87 between the injury supporting standing and
the claimed violation of the due process clause of the fifth amend7 The Court stated that "[ilt is undisputed that the 'environmental interest' that the appellees seek to protect is within the interests to be protected by NEPA ... ." Id. at 686 n. 13.
81The difference can be seen by comparing the results in SCRAP with Warth v. Seldin,

422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975). In Warth, the majority, in denying standing to various groups and
nonresident individuals to challenge zoning practices that allegedly excluded low income

residents, held "that a plaintiff who seeks to challenge exclusionary zoning practices must
allege specific, concrete facts demonstrating that the challenged practices harm him, and that
he personally would benefit in a tangible way from the court's intervention." Id.

81For a discussion of the causation element, see Warth, 422 U.S. at 504-08.
438 U.S. 59 (1978).
Id. at 66-67 (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1970 ed., Supp. V)).
"Duke, 438 U.S. at 69. Obviously, plaintiffs could only be deprived of their property if an
3

accident occurred with the resulting damages in excess of the statutory ceiling. The record
indicated that the chances of this were slight.
Id. at 73-74.
8 Id. at 74.
87See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968).
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ment.8 In previous cases, the Supreme Court had required plaintiffs
to show a "logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim
sought to be adjudicated."8 9 Consequently, it was insufficient for
plaintiffs to show that they were injured by the defendant's acts.
The plaintiffs also had to show that the defendant violated some duty
owed to the plaintiff. 90 Thus, the nexus requirement is equivalent to
the zone of interests test 9' because both the recognition of a duty
toward the plaintiff and a specific statutory prohibition are intended
to protect citizens from a recognizable harm. 92 Under a nexus analysis, a court's finding of an environmental injury could not, absent
the most extreme circumstances, be the basis of a fifth amendment
claim.
To grant standing, and thus decide on the merits, the Duke Court
was willing to limit the formerly pervasive nexus requirement to
cases of taxpayer standing and cases concerning the rights of third
parties. 93 Consequently, the Court found an environmental injury to
be an injury sufficient to support a claim under the fifth amendment. 94 The Court was thus willing to manipulate the constitutional
95
nexus requirement to reach the merits of an environmental case.
In Duke, the Court was also willing to relax the requirement that
the standing injury be "fairly traceable" to the challenged action of
the defendant.9 6 Traceability differs from nexus because traceability
refers to the relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff
while nexus refers to the relationship between the statute and the
plaintiff. The Duke Court accepted the District Court's finding that
there was a substantial likelihood that Duke would not be able to
complete the construction and maintain the operation of the nuclear
plants but for the protection of the Price-Anderson Act. 97 In accepting this finding, the Court rejected the defendant's argument that
the plants would be built even without the Price-Anderson limitations and, thus, the Act was not the "but for" cause of the disputed
83 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law").
- Flast, 392 U.S. at 102.

90L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 98 (1978).
91See

supra text accompanying notes 50-68.
9 DataProcessing, 397 U.S. at 153-55 (1970).
9 Duke, 438 U.S. at 78-81.
9
'Id. at 81.
95Id. at 78-81.
9 Id. at
17Id. at

74-75.
74-75 (citing Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 431 F.
Supp. 203, 220 (W.D.N.C. 1977)).
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power plants and their alleged adverse effects.9 8 The basis for the

defendant's argument was that if the Act had not been passed,
Congress may have chosen to construct nuclear power plants as a

government monopoly. 99 The Court held that nothing in its past cases
required a party to negate the kind of speculative and hypothetical
possibilities suggested to demonstrate that judicial relief would be

effective. 100
Thus, in several of its decisions, the Supreme Court has been

willing to lessen the requirements of standing for plaintiffs alleging
environmental injuries.' 0' In reducing the standing requirements,
the Court has focused on the requirements of injury in fact, causation, and the relationship between the claimed injury and the statute

or constitutional provision under which relief is sought. 10 2 As a result, the Court has tended to discount the widespread nature of a
particular injury'0 3 and to find more readily a congressional grant of

standing that displaces the Court's own prudential limitations. 104
Jurists and legal scholars have long criticized the Supreme Court's

practices regarding standing.0 5 One notable critic is Justice Antonin
Scalia who fundamentally disagrees with the Court's theory of standing. He enunciated this theory in a 1983 article' 0 6 in which he viewed
standing as an essential element of the separation of powers.
"Duke, 438 U.S. at 77-78.
9 Id. at 75.
"0 Id. at 78. This holding should be contrasted with the Court's holding in Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975); see supra note 79 for a discussion of Warth's requirements of
specificity for showing a causal link between the act complained of and the alleged injury.
A stricter application of the causation requirement is seen in Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461
U.S. 95 (1983). There, the defendant, Lyons, was stopped for a traffic violation by police who
proceeded, allegedly without provocation, to seize him and to apply a chokehold that rendered
him unconscious and damaged his larynx. Id. at 97-98. Lyons sought injunctive relief preventing Los Angeles police from using the hold except in life-threatening situations. Id. at
98. The Supreme Court held that Lyons had no standing. The Court ruled that, for Lyons to
establish a causal link between the act complained of and the alleged injury, he would have
to show that he would have another encounter with the police, that all police always choke
any citizen with whom they happen to have an encounter, and that the city authorized the
police to act in such a manner. Id. at 105-06. These examples show that the required causal
link is much less in environmental litigation.
101See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978);
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S.
669 (1973).
"' See Duke, 438 U.S. at 72-81; SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 683-90.
I" SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 687.
10 Id. at 646 n.13.
101See articles cited supra note 11.
1" Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an EssentialElement of the Separationof Powers,
17 SUFFoLK U.L. REV. 881 (1983) [hereinafter Separationof Powers].
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III. JUSTICE ScALIA'S THEORY OF STANDING
Scalia's disagreement with the Supreme Court's current standing
doctrine goes to the heart of that doctrine. 10 7 The Supreme Court
has viewed the standing doctrine as having a constitutional core
whose exact contours vary according to the prudential limitations
set by the Court. 08 Scalia, however, states that the existence of
standing is largely within the control of Congress in that Congress
can create individual legal rights that the judiciary must then enforce. 10 9 When Congress creates such a right, the courts must hear
the case." 0 Prudential limitations come into effect where, for example, Congress requires the executive to implement a general welfare program for the benefit of the majority."' In such cases, the
prudential limitations act as a set of presumptions derived from the2
common law. These presumptions determine if a legal right exists."
Congress can displace this latter inquiry by explicitly granting standing, provided that the grant does not provide standing when3 the
constitutional requirement of particularized injury is not met."
There is more to Scalia's dissatisfaction with the current standing
doctrine, however, than a dispute over the internal workings of the
Court's analysis of the standing doctrine. Scalia has also found fault
with the Court's "readiness" to imply a congressional grant of standing in a particular statute where no explicit grant exists.14
The most important example of this "liberalization"" 5 of the standing doctrine appears in the current interpretation the Supreme Court
has given the judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)." 6 Scalia disputes the liberalized gloss placed on
the APA by the zone of interests test."'i He has read the APA as
107 Id. at 885. The next section is based mainly on Scalia's 1983 standing article. The purpose
of relying primarily on Scalia's articles instead of his opinions on the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals is to highlight the distinction between Scalia's pure theoretical perspective
and the manner in which that perspective is put into practice. The tensions inherent between
Justice Scalia's twin roles of scholar and jurist could modify his practical approach to jurisprudential problems during his tenure on the Supreme Court.
1, See supra text accompanying notes 5-49.
109
Separationof Powers, supra note 106, at 885.

110Id.

"I Id. at 886.
112Id.

113Id.
114

Id.

,,5
Id. at 887.

5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982).
117
Separationof Powers, supra note 106, at 888-89 (citing Data Processing, 397 U.S. at
154-55). See supra text accompanying notes 63-68.
116
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only granting standing where there was a previously recognized legal
wrong or where there was a specific congressional grant of standing."" In short, although Scalia has agreed that Congress has the
ability to displace the courts' prudential limitations," 9 he has said
that the Court has found such displacements where Congress never
intended them. 20 Thus, for Scalia, the Supreme Court's behavior
has "transmorgrified" already liberalized grants of standing "into an
affirmative grant of standing in 'all situations in which a party who
is in fact aggrieved seeks review, regardless of a lack of legal right
'12
or specific statutory language."" '
The gist of Scalia's disagreement with the present standing doctrine concerns the change in the judiciary's role resulting from these
new liberalized rules of standing. 12 Standing, for Scalia, functions
to restrict courts to their traditional role of protecting individuals
and minorities against what has customarily been termed the "tyranny of the majority."'2 Standing does this by ensuring that the
plaintiff is either the object of the law's requirement or prohibition,
or suffers some "concrete injury" as a direct result of that law. 12A It
is in this manner that standing functions as a mechanism to maintain
the separation of powers. '2 Such a view is consistent with the basic
tenets of judicial restraint. These basic tenets seek to limit the role
of the courts in relation to the other branches of government. 126
This self-governing mechanism of standing operates on a number
of different levels. Scalia starts from the premise that there are
certain areas in which the courts should not be involved. 127 One such
area is that of the political negotiation found within the rulemaking
process of administrative law. 128 For Scalia, some agency decisions
I'8 Separationof Powers, supra note 106,

at 887.

"'Id.at 886.
'o Id. (citing Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d
608, 616 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966) (Federal Power Act provision of
right to review for aggrieved parties held to give standing to those who by their activities
and conduct have exhibited a special interest in the aesthetic, conservational, and recreational
aspects of power development)).
121 Separation of Powers, supra note 106, at 889 (citing Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v.
Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1970)).
12 Separationof Powers, supra note 106, at 890-93.
I= Id. at 894.
vA

Id. at 894-95.

Id. at 890-93. This view is not without support. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
See also, Logan, Standing to Sue: A Proposed Separationof Powers Analysis, 1984 Wis. L.
REV. 37.
Posner, The Meaning of JudicialSelf-Restraint, 59 IND. L.J. 1, 11-12 (1983).
m See Separationof Powers, supra note 106, at 889.
m Scalia, Rulemaking as Politics, 34 ADMIN. L. REV. v, v (1982).
125
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are made merely because they are what the majority wants, at least
as those wants are reflected in the political processes, and are not
necessarily based on any other rational explanation. 1 Standing,
according to Scalia, should function to insure that the courts are not
able to alter this type of political decisionmaking. As Scalia explains
this function:
The doctrine of standing ...was almost tailor-made to protect
political discretion. It is rudimentary political science that slight
harm, expense or inconvenience imposed on a large, diffuse body
of the population will generally not arouse effective political
opposition. But diffuseness, expansiveness, lack of particularity
was what the doctrine of standing was all about. In other words,
it excluded from the courts precisely those interests that were
likely to lose in a rulemaking proceeding with substantial political
content--the potential hikers and campers who would be harmed
by construction of a new ski resort, to take a real life example. 130
Scalia therefore has concluded that the trend of judicial and legislative liberalization of standing has removed the barriers that confine
131
the courts to protecting only minority rights.
Scalia has contended that another reason for the courts to stay
out of these "majoritarian" processes is the judiciary's inability to

promote majority interests. 132 For Scalia, the judiciary, because of
their training, typically upper-middle class background, and unaccountability tend to not do "what is good for the people" but instead
tend to enforce the political prejudices of their own class. 13 3 Scalia
gives the following example of this type of behavior:
Their greatest success in such an enterprise-ensuring strict
enforcement of the environmental laws, not to protect particular
minorities but for the benefit of all the people-met with approval in the classrooms of Cambridge and New Haven, but not
in the factories of Detroit and the mines of West Virginia. It
may well be, of course, that the judges know what is good for
the people better than the people themselves; or that democracy
simply does not permit the genuine desires of the people to be
given effect; but those are not the premises under which our
system operates.'3
,2Id. at v-vi.
'o Id. at vi (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972)).
13,
See Separationof Powers, supra note 106, at 892-93.
13 Id. at 896.
11 Id. See also, B. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDIcIAL PROCESS 174-75 (1921) ("The

spirit of the age, as it is revealed to each of us, is too often only the spirit of the group in
which the accidents of birth or education or occupation or fellowship have given us a place").
'14Separationof Powers, supra note 106, at 897.
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Thus, according to Scalia, even if judges are correct, they should
only become involved in assuring the regularity of agency action
when such assurance is incidental to deciding the rights of individuals. 1

5

It is not the courts' duty "to see that important legislative

purposes, heralded in the halls of Congress, are not lost or misdirected in the vast hallways of the federal bureaucracy.""13 On the
contrary, Scalia has viewed the executive branch's ability to lose or
misdirect laws as a prime component of social change, and thus3 any
7
judicial attempts to prevent this are "profoundly conservative.' 1
In short, the traditional function of standing has been to enforce
the separation of powers by ensuring that the courts are not converted into a forum for political debate, open to all, to address any
issue. 38 By excluding all persons from bringing a particular issue
before the court, lack of standing thus necessarily excludes that issue
from judicial resolution. 39 Therefore, Scalia has supported this traditional function of standing. He has viewed standing as a tool of
judicial self-restraint because its usefulness arises from its ability to
limit the power of the courts.
For Scalia, the key to standing's function of enforcing separation
of powers arises from the necessity of a concrete injury. 4° A concrete
injury is an essential requirement according to Scalia because it
separates the injured party from all others who claim a benefit from
the social contract. "4' The social contract refers only to the basic
philosophical idea that society formed as a mutually advantageous
cooperative venture with rules that restrict liberty in such a way as
to yield advantages for all. 42 Many commentators have viewed the
social contract as encompassing only the provision and allocation of
"'5

Id. at 884 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803)).

13

Separationof Powers,supra note 106, at 884 (quoting Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm.,

Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971)). Calvert Cliffs held, in

part, that the courts have the power to require agencies to comply with procedural directions
of National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. 449 F.2d at 1114-15.
3 Separationof Powers, supra note 106, at 897. This substitution of a normally conceived

conservative viewpoint with a normally conceived liberal viewpoint is a common rhetorical
device employed by Justice Scalia. For an interesting discussion of the way in which judges
employ language see Weisberg, How Judges Speak: Some Lessons on Adjudication in Billy
Budd, Sailor With an Application to JusticeRehnquist, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1982).
n

See Separationof Powers, supra note 106, at 892.

139Id.

140Id. at 895.

Id.
J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 112 (1971). See generally J. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL
CONTRACT (1762); J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT (1714).
141
2

4

19871

JUSTICE SCALIA

material advantages. 4 3 Therefore, according to these commentators,

injury in fact limits governmental control to the terms of the social
contract by ensuring that the courts cannot enforce particular ideological preferences. Because, however, the concrete injury is a vio-

lation of the terms of the social contract, the injured party is entitled
to special protection from the democratic manner in which social-

contractual affairs are normally handled. 4 4 This special protection
is, of course, the province of the courts.

Scalia has also stated, however, that although necessary, concrete
injury in and of itself is not enough for standing; the plaintiff must
also establish minority status relevant to the particular government
transaction from which the alleged injury arose. 145 Therefore, according to Scalia, not all concrete injuries would be capable of sup-

porting a congressional conferral of standing.

46

He has stated that

there are injuries that are so widely shared that even a specific

congressional provision protecting against that harm would not define a proper minority capable of invoking judicial protection. 47 As
an example of such a widespread injury, Scalia has cited the Supreme
Court's finding in SCRAP 148 of an injury to all who breathe the
14 For example, Professor Stewart explains the relationship between injury in fact and the
social contract as follows:
The ultimate ground of the "injury in fact" test reminiscent of the common law's
focus on the protection of material interests, may be in the contractarian theory of
government. Put simply the theory is this: the justification for government lies in
individuals' willingness to assent to a scheme of mutual cooperation that increases
individuals' opportunity to satisfy their preferences. Social action, when limited to
the provision and allocation of material advantages, requires no general agreement
on personal preferences or values. So long as only material interests are accorded
protection by law, rules can be formulated which will enable each individual to pursue
his own ends through a system of reciprocity that increases wealth, leisure, and the
like, thus enlarging material opportunities for all. If ideological interests are accorded
legal protections, however, two basic difficulties emerge. First, ideological interests
.. often have an all or nothing feature .... If several conflicting ideological interests are accorded recognition, or even one ideological interest that conflicts with
material interests, it may be impossible to achieve stable compromise. Second, vindication of a litigant's ideological preferences may require others to acknowledge
principles which they reject. But such enforced orthodoxy is contrary to contractarian
premises; an agreement to share the fruits of cooperative endeavor is not an undertaking to embrace another's ideology.
Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1669, 1739
(1975) (citations omitted).
144 Separationof Powers, supra note 106, at 895.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147

Id. at 895-96.
U.S. at 687.
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country's air as the type of injury that should not be capable of
supporting standing to sue. 49 It seems, therefore, that Scalia would
shift consideration of the widespread nature of the injury from its
place as a discretionary prudential consideration to a core requirement of article 111.150
Accordingly, Scalia believes that the current dysfunctional state
of the standing doctrine is directly related to the lessening of judicial
focus on the requirement of a concrete, particularized injury that
sets the claimant apart from the citizenry as a whole. 151 Scalia has
contended that liberalization of standing has affected two great
changes in the judicial system.152 First, it has given courts the ability
to address issues that were previously beyond the scope of their
powers. 15 Second, the liberalized standing rules have also given
courts the ability to address issues promptly at the behest of almost
anyone.'- The courts are thus now a key component of any public
debate because of the prompt access that they afford to airing polit55
ical issues.1
This combination of breadth and immediacy of judicial review,
Scalia has stated, has directly resulted in the "overjudicialization of
the processes of self-governance.'

1

56

Such a view represents Scalia's

adherence to the philosophy of judicial self-restraint, which sets, as
an important goal of judicial decisionmaking, the reduction in the
power of the courts in relation to the other branches of government. 157 A judge accomplishes this reduction by deferring to the
decisions of Congress and the administrative agencies. 158 This deference can take one of two forms. First, a judge can defer to the merits
of a case by finding that another branch of government has already
decided the issue. 159 Alternatively, the judge can restrict the court's
ability to decide issues by tightening up access to judicial review by
strict enforcement of procedural rules. Scalia's entire theory of
standing can thus be seen as an embodiment of this second method
of judicial self-restraint. Scalia seeks to trim the power of the courts
149
Separationof Powers, supra note

106, at 896.

'50U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
151Separationof Powers, supra note 106, at 881-82.
-2 See id. at 892-93.
- Id. at 892.

1-4
Id. at 892-93.
Im Id. at 893.
156
Id.at 881.
7
15
See R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 208 (1985).
153Id.

119
See id.
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by limiting the type of litigants, and therefore the type of issues,
that the courts can hear.
Scalia has suggested that this trimming of the courts' power
through standing can be accomplished in three ways. 160 First, the
courts should strictly adhere to the requirement of a distinctive and
particularized injury that distinguishes the plaintiff from the population as a whole.'16 Second, the courts should refrain from discerning
broad congressional grants of standing unless such grants are explicit. 162 Even with an explicit grant, however, the courts must
insure that legislative conferrals of standing do not infringe upon
the constitutional core requirement of a concrete and particularized
injury. 6 3 Finally, the judiciary must recognize the original meaning
and intent of the APA's definitional phrase "adversely affected or
aggrieved within the meaning of a relevant statute" to insure that
standing is not expanded any further.164
Functionally, Scalia has viewed standing as a constraint on the
judiciary's ability to usurp the functions of the other branches of
government. His theory thus stresses the limited nature of the
courts' role in solving societal problems. For Scalia, judicial decisionmaking is only proper and useful to protect a minority interest
that would lose in the democratic processes. Where, however, an
injury or burden is dispersed over most or all of the population,
Scalia's position has been that it is impracticable that all should be
able to directly voice their concern by resort to the judiciary. 165 In
a complex society, such rights are protected by the people's power
over the elected official, or as Scalia would say, the democratic
66
processes.1
Scalia's espoused standing theory could have a great impact on
standing to sue in environmental litigation. Where the harm is widespread and individually minimal, as in many environmental cases, it
11Separationof Powers, supra note 106, at 897-99.
161See id. at 898.
"6
163

See id.
See id. at 896.

16 See id. at 898-99.

This theory is analogous to Justice Holmes' analysis in Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v.
State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915), of when a hearing was necessary to meet the
requirements of due process. In that case, Holmes held that a hearing was only required
where government action affected a relatively small number of persons in an exceptional
manner and in each case upon individual grounds. Id. at 446. This concept is akin to Scalia's
requirement of a concrete injury that sets the plaintiff apart from the population as a whole.
See Separationof Powers, supra note 106, at 894-95. Both Holmes' construction and Scalia's
theory of standing recognize a limited applicability and utility for judicial-type resolutions.
10 Separationof Powers, supra note 106, at 896.
165
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may be impossible to find someone who is sufficiently and specifically
harmed to satisfy Scalia's high threshold of injury in fact. This is
one reason why environmental law, as both a main beneficiary of,
and the main driving force behind the liberalized standing trend, 167
could suffer from a Scaliaesque standing doctrine.
The obvious disdain that Scalia shows for the grants of standing
in environmental cases'6 should raise concern among environmentalists as to whether he will be instrumental in restricting future
access to the courts for environmental plaintiffs. Further, in a 1984
decision, the Supreme Court denied standing to parents of black
school children who alleged that the Internal Revenue Service had
not adopted sufficient standards to deny tax-exempt status to racially
discriminating private schools. 169 The Court held that requirements
of standing are to be interpreted in reference to separation of powers
principles. 7 0 Although Scalia was not on the Court when that opinion
was written, such an analysis echoes Scalia's own theoretical base
and thus indicates that he might have some support on the Supreme
Court for restricting judicial review.' 7' Finally, at least one commentator has noted a conservative trend in recent Supreme Court
environmental law decisions' 72 decided before Scalia joined the
Court. This trend could be augmented by the addition of the judicially conservative Scalia. It is instructive to focus on these concerns
through an analysis of Scalia's standing theory during his tenure on
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. From this foundation in
Scalia's judicial opinions, it will be possible to explore his potential
effect on future environmental litigation.

IV. JUSTICE SCALIA AND STANDING: PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF

HIs THEORY
During his term on the District of Columbia Court of Appeals,
Justice Scalia wrote a substantial number of opinions concerning

167See supra text accompanying notes 69-105.
168See supra text accompanying notes 130 & 134.

1 Aen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 739 (1984).

Id. at 752.
the Justices who made up the Allen majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White,
and Justice O'Connor are still on the Court.
170

171Of

172

The Supreme Court and Environmental Law: A Whole New Ballgame?, 14 Envtl. L.

Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,262 (July, 1984).
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standing.'73 The large number alone indicates the doctrine's importance to Scalia and his use of that doctrine to enforce his policy of
judicial restraint. Although Scalia's tenure on the Court of Appeals
was too short to draw any definite conclusions concerning trends
that may have developed over time, it is safe to say that Scalia's
early standing opinions adhered much more closely to his theoretical
base than his more recent opinions. 174 Such time-based factors, however, only partially reveal what appears to be a trend away from
Scalid's own doctrinal theory of standing. Four exemplary cases will
serve to illustrate these changes. These decisions, despite the move
away from his theoretical stance, still indicate that Scalia may not
be favorably disposed to most environmental interests. The reason
for this position, however, is not that he is anti-environmental, but
rather because such a position is a necessary adjunct of his main
policy of judicial self-restraint. In other words, Scalia's decisions in
173Scalia sat on the District of Columbia Court of Appeals from 1982 until his appointment
to the Supreme Court in 1986. He wrote eighteen opinions on the issue of standing. Aluminum
Co. of America v. United States, 790 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Block v. Meese, 793 F.2d
1303 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Center for Auto Safety v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin.,
793 F.2d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Scalia, J., dissenting); In re Center for Auto Safety, 793 F.2d
1346 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Thomas v. New York, 802 F.2d 1443 (D.C. Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3196 (1987) (Scalia, J., took no part in the consideration of the
petitions for certiorari); Regular Common Carrier Conference v. United States, 793 F.2d 376
(D.C. Cir. 1986); FAIC Securities, Inc. v. United States, 768 F.2d 352 (D.C. Cir. 1985);
Securities Industry Ass'n v. Comptroller of the Currency, 758 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per
curiam, Scalia, J., dissenting from the court's finding of standing), aff'd in partrev'd in part,
107 S. Ct. 750 (1987) (Court affirmed grant of standing but reversed on the merits; Scalia, J.,
took no part in the consideration of the case); Center for Auto Safety v. Ruckelshaus, 747
F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1984); New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution v. Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 727 F.2d 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Ramnirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J., dissenting), vacated, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985); United Presbyterian
Church in the U.S.A. v. Reagan, 738 F.2d 1375 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Community Nutrition
Institute v. Block, 698 F.2d 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part), rev'd, 467 U.S. 340 (1984); National Coalition to Ban Handguns v. Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco & Firearms, 715 F.2d 632 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Safir v. Dole, 718 F.2d 475 (D.C. Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1206 (1984); Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Dole, 723 F.2d 975 (D.C.
Cir 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984); Covelo Indian Community v. Watt, Nos. 82-2377,
82-2417, slip op. (D.C. Cir. Dec. 21, 1982) (LEXIS, Genfed library, USAPP file) (per curiam,
Scalia, J., dissenting).
174Such trends are uncertain for a number of reasons. First, there are no factually similar
cases that occur in both his earlier and later years. Such a lack of "benchmarks" makes it
difficult to discount other variables that may have influenced a particular decision. More
importantly for our purposes, the cases which concern standing in environmental litigation
came within Scalia's last year on the Court of Appeals, making it impossible to isolate any
changes which are a function of his length of time on the bench. Consequently, this note will
limit itself to discussing only the most broadly obvious time-based trends.
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environmental litigation will not be dictated by whether he favors
environmental interests, but by how the decision promotes his own
judicial agenda.
A. Covelo Indian Community v. Watt: Justice Scalia's Theory in
Practice
Scalia's earliest opinion on standing, Covelo Indian Community
v. Watt, 175 is a textbook example of his standing theory. In Covelo,
Scalia dissented from the Court of Appeals' grant of standing to the
plaintiffs, an Indian group who brought suit in federal district court
seeking declaratory and mandatory injunctive relief for the Depart6
ment of the Interior's failure to act as required by federal statute.17
The statute required the Secretary of the Interior, after consultation
with the Attorney General, to submit to Congress by December 31,
1982, legislative proposals to resolve certain Indian claims that the
Secretary and Attorney General felt were inappropriate to resolve
by litigation. 177 Although the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) identified approximately 17,000 Indian claims, the Departments of Interior and Justice rejected almost all as inappropriate for litigation
and submitted only two legislative proposals to Congress.178
On the issue of standing, the government argued that the Indian
group did not meet the article III requirements because: (1) they
did not suffer the requisite injury in fact, and (2) there was no
likelihood that the relief requested would redress any of the Indians'
claimed injuries. 179 The plaintiffs countered that they had standing
17-Covelo Indian Community v. Watt, No. 82-2377, 82-2417, slip op. (D.C. Cir. Dec. 21,
1982) (LEXIS, Genfed library, USAPP file) (per curiam, Scalia, J., dissenting).
176Covelo, slip op., majority opinion (referring to 28 U.S.C. § 2415 (1982)).
177Covelo, slip op., majority opinion. 28 U.S.C. § 2415 imposed a statute of limitations on
certain actions brought by the United States as plaintiff. The original statute did not specifically discuss claims brought by the United States, as trustee, on behalf of Indian groups. The
United States holds the Indians' land in either trust or restricted status and is required to
bring actions on their behalf in disputes concerning that land. Since concern was expressed
as to whether the statute involved included suit by the United States in this capacity, Congress
amended the statute to specifically include Indian claims and to extend the time period for
filing those actions. In pertinent part, the statute provided that:
Not later then [December 31, 1982], the Secretary of the Interior, after consultation
with the Attorney General, shall submit to the Congress legislative proposals to
resolve those Indian claims subject to the amendments made by the first section of
this Act that the Secretary of the Interior or the Attorney General believes are not
appropriate to resolve by litigation.
28 U.S.C. § 2415.
178 Covelo, slip op., majority opinion.
179 Covelo Indian Community v. Watt, 551 F. Supp. 366, 379-80 (D.D.C. 1982).
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under the APA 180 to challenge defendant's conduct under the statute
because the plaintiffs were within the "zone of interests" protected
by that statute.' 8 ' In affirming the District Court's decision, the
Court of Appeals agreed that the plaintiffs had standing to enforce
the statute's mandate requiring the Secretary to submit legislative
82
proposals to resolve nonlitigated claims.
The majority in Covelo held that the plaintiffs' injury, the failure
of the Departments of Justice and Interior to press Indian claims,
was within the "zone of interests" protected by the statute.1 83 The
court thus held that no bar existed to the plaintiffs' claim based on
prudential considerations.18 The court rejected the government's
article III argument that the plaintiffs had not shown a sufficient
likelihood of redress for their injury because their only injury was
failure to receive monetary relief for their claims. 18' Instead, the
court stated that the plaintiffs had a statutory right to have their
trustee bring their claims in an appropriate forum, or, in lieu of
18 6
litigation, in the form of a legislative proposal.
The majority held, therefore, that the government's refusal to
provide assistance deprived the Indian group of a legally cognizable
right whose connection to final resolution of their underlying damage
claims was established by Congress. 187 Thus, the Covelo court characterized the case as an example of "the well-established rule that
when the Constitution or a statute confers procedural rights on
certain persons, those persons have standing to insist that the government follow proper procedures in reaching a substantive decision .... 188 In Covelo, the connection between the relief sought and
180
5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982).
181Covelo, 551 F. Supp. at 380.

182
Covelo, slip op., majority opinion.
83

1

Id.

184The court stated that "[gliven Congress' direct order to the Secretary to submit legislation, the government's special fiduciary relationship to the Indians, and Congress' purpose
to resolve the claims justly and equitably, prudential considerations favor finding that appellees
have standing to enforce the congressional mandate." Id.
18

5 Id.

18

6 Id.
187Id.

188

Id. The government cited Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426

U.S. 26 (1976), to argue that the deprivation of such a procedural benefit is not connected
closely enough to the tangible injury to meet the standing requirements. Id. The court rejected

this argument by narrowly reading Simon to hold only 'that unless a plaintiff can show that
a different substantive result from a government defendant will likely bring about the redress
of its substantive injury, it has no standing to raise a procedural challenge that may lead to

that substantive result." Id.
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the injury was clear. 89 The court found that the statute manifested
congressional intent that the Department use its knowledge and
resources to help the Indians resolve their claims. 90 The plaintiffs'
injury according to the court was the loss of that help and was,
therefore, redressable by an order requiring the Department to
submit legislative proposals.' 9'
Based on the Supreme Court's then current position on standing,
the majority's opinion appears to be the proper result. First, the
Covelo court's liberal reading of the "zone of interests" test is consistent with the Supreme Court's own reading of that test.1 2 Second,
the court also followed the Supreme Court's expansive reading of
the judicial review provisions of the APA. 91 Using such a reading,
the Covelo court found that the Department of the Interior's failure
to submit legislative proposals, as they were required to do, was
sufficient to constitute agency action that aggrieved or adversely
affected the plaintiffs.' 94 Finally, because Congress created a specific
procedure to benefit plaintiffs, and because that procedure was not
utilized, the plaintiffs were sufficiently injured for standing purposes
195
by being deprived of that statutory right.
Scalia, however, viewed this situation somewhat differently and
thus dissented from the court's finding of standing. 196 Although his
dissent presents a logically persuasive argument, the rightness or
wrongness of his views are not the important issue. What makes
Scalia's dissent interesting is that it presents almost the same purely
theoretical view of standing that he presented in his 1983 article on
the subject of standing. 97
Scalia began his dissent by stating that "[t]he Constitution permits
the courts ... to sit in judgment upon the handiwork of the coordinate branches of government only when the 'case or controversy'
requirements of article III are satisfied. "198 This statement is a clear
reworking of the idea found in his Separation of Powers article. 99
18
1

Covelo, slip op., majority opinion.

9 Id. (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 2415 (1982)).

191
Covelo, slip op., majority opinion.
1 See Data Processing Services Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1970).
1935 U.S.C. § 702 (1982). For an example of this expansive reading, see Data Processing,
397 U.S. at 153-54.
194Covelo, slip op., majority
19 See Data Processing,397

opinion.

U.S. at 153.
slip op., dissenting opinion.
9 See Separationof Powers, supra note 106.
198 Covelo, slip op., dissenting opinion.
' Separation of Powers, supra note 106.
196 Covelo,
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In Separationof Powers, Scalia wrote that courts should only "assure the regularity of executive action" as an incidental effect of
deciding on the rights of individual litigants. 20 0 Both the article and
the Covelo dissent view standing functionally as a tool to protect
separation of powers. Moreover, a deeper analysis of his Covelo
dissent reveals both a strongly conservative view of standing and
an almost direct application of
his theoretical view of standing to the
201
case.
particular
this
of
facts
The tone of Scalia's Covelo dissent manifests his strong disagreement with the majority's finding of standing. Scalia's dissent uses
the phrase "sit in judgment" to criticize the majority's behavior by
making reference to substantive due process and the rejected role
of the court as a "superlegislature. '' 20 2 Further, Scalia juxtaposes
this statement with the word "handiwork," which is defined as a
personal or individual achievement. 2 3 Here, Scalia seemed to be
saying that the executive's non-enforcement of the statute requiring
them to submit legislative proposals was within the executive's discretion and that the court's action was based merely on a disagreement over the proper policy to follow in Indian claim cases. As such,
the court, according to Scalia, usurped the executive's proper policymaking role and thus violated the principles of separation of powers. 204 Such behavior is antithetical to Scalia's philosophy of judicial
self-restraint.
The Covelo dissent also reveals Scalia's use of a stricter injury in
fact standard for establishing standing. 205 Scalia's basic thesis in the
dissent was that there was no injury in the article III sense, because
the claimed injury was unlikely to be redressed or remedied by the
relief requested. 20 6 Scalia, therefore, saw the Indians' inability to
win on their claims as their only injury. 20 7 Scalia thus did not recognize any judicially reviewable injury resulting from the Department of the Interior's initial refusal to carry out the statutorily
28
mandated procedure specifically enacted to benefit the appellees. 1

21
20 3

See id. at 883-84 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803)).
See Covelo, slip op., dissenting opinion.
See Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952).
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1027 (1981).

2 See Covelo, slip op., dissenting opinion.
20 See id.
2

See id.
See id.

See id. Scalia goes on to say in his dissent that the duty imposed on the Department of
the Interior may itself have been unconstitutional on separation of powers grounds. It

seems

reasonable to argue that either: (1) Scalia transposed the separation of powers infirmities of
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Instead, he stated that "[n]either on our own authority nor by
congressional directive may we undertake to adjudicate a claim
which does not present an injury in fact to the plaintiffs .... -"20 For
Scalia, this situation involved nothing more.than keeping the courts
out of an area involving political discretion. 210 In his critical view,
the majority "[saw] that important legislative purposes, heralded in
the halls of Congress, are not lost or misdirected in the vast hallways
of the federal bureaucracy.

21

' In other words, the majority was

treading where they did not belong. Scalia's Covelo dissent, by
denying standing to sue concerning an affirmative governmental
duty, thus established a high threshold for what constitutes injury
in fact.
Moreover, Scalia's dissent in Covelo indicates that he was not as
ready as the majority to find a congressional grant of standing. He
stated that: "It is enough to note that if Congress can create an
'injury in fact' by merely saying that a particular class has a 'right'
to have something done, the case or controversy clause will have
been transformed from a constitutional imperative to a statutory
option. '212 Therefore, for Scalia, the injury cannot merely consist of
the denial of a statutory right. The injury must still meet the strictures of article III.213

In his Covelo dissent, Scalia closely adhered to several of his
theoretical bases.

214

First, he demanded a high level of injury to

meet the article III requirements. 21 5 Second, he indicated that courts
should stay out of what he termed the political discretion involved
216
in executive action, even if there was such a showing of injury.
Finally, Scalia was not willing to find a congressional conferral of
standing absent the type of injury that he viewed as essential for
standing. 217 Covelo thus represents Scalia's strict reading of the

standing requirements.
the statute onto the question of standing, or (2) Scalia used standing to dismiss the appeal
because he did not want to get to the unraised question of the unconstitutionality of the

statute. Either way, the opinion manifests an early recognition by Scalia of the extra-judicial
uses of the standing doctrine. See PIERCE, supra note 15, at 143.
Covelo, slip op., dissenting opinion.
210 See Scalia, Rulemaking as Politics, 34 ADMIN. L. REV. v, v (1982).
211Separation of Powers, supra note 106, at 884 (quoting Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating
Comm., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
212Covelo, slip op., dissenting opinion.
213U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
214See Covelo, slip op., dissenting opinion.
215See id.; see Separationof Powers, supra note 106, at 898.
216See Covelo, slip op., dissenting opinion; see also Scalia, Rulemaking as Politics, supra
note 210, at v.
217See Covelo, slip op., dissenting opinion; see also Separationof Powers, supra note 106,
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B. Center for Auto Safety v. Ruckelshaus and Thomas v. New
York: Justice Scalia's Theory in Environmental Cases
The standing issue was also present in both of the environmental
cases for which Scalia wrote opinions while on the Court of Appeals. 218 In these opinions, Scalia could have addressed the reduced
requirements of injury in fact that had been used in environmental
litigation. Instead of asserting his stricter requirements for injury
in fact, however, Scalia adhered to the favored position of environmental litigation. 219 He thus found standing for injuries that were
insufficient to support standing under his prior analysis. 220
For example, Scalia's opinion in Center for Auto Safety v. Ruckelshaus,221 evidenced a radical departure from his previous view of
standing. Centerfor Auto Safety concerned section 207 of the Clean
Air Act.222 Section 207 directs the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to require manufacturer submission of a plan to remedy nonconformance with maximum emission
standards.m Until this case, the EPA had required and had only
approved plans that committed auto manufacturers to recall and
repair nonconforming vehicles.2
In carrying out section 207, the EPA tested a particular engine
group of General Motors (GM) automobiles.m All the cars exceeded
the maximum emissions standards, and the EPA ordered GM to
submit a plan for remedying the nonconformity. 226 Instead of submitting a plan for recall and repair of the 1979 vehicles, GM submitted a plan that proposed engineering the 1982 and 1983 engine
families to meet a target lower than mandatory emission standards. 22 7 GM claimed that this offset plan would achieve emissions

at 892-93. It must be remembered that Scalia also views injuries which do not place the
plaintiff within a distinct minority as insufficient to confer standing and thus such parties are
incapable of invoking judicial protection. Id. at 894-95.
218 Thomas v. New York, 802 F.2d 1443 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3196 (1987)
(Scalia, J., took no part in the consideration of the petitions for certiorari); Center for Auto
Safety v. Ruckelshaus, 747 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
219 See Center for Auto Safety, 747 F.2d at 3 n.2; Thomas, 802 F.2d at 1445-46. See also
supra text accompanying notes 69-104, for a discussion of standing in environmental litigation.
See Centerfor Auto Safety, 747 F.2d at 3 n.2; Thomas, 802 F.2d at 1445-46. See also
supra text accompanying notes 106-172 for a discussion of Justice Scalia's standing theory.
'747 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
See id. at 2.
42 U.S.C. § 7541(c)(1) (1982).
Centerfor Auto Safety, 747 F.2d at 2.
?SId. at 3.
2W Id.
2 7

Id.
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benefits equal to recall and repair.m The EPA accepted the plan and
published a notice of its decision2 9 Center for Auto Safety, two
other non-profit organizations, and three private individuals petitioned the Court of Appeals for review of the EPA's decision.? 0 The
petitioners claimed that the EPA's action was unlawful because the
offset plan did not remedy the nonconformity within the meaning of
section 207, and that repair and recall was the only acceptable remedy under the statute.21
The facts in Centerfor Auto Safety describe the type of case where
Scalia had previously criticized other courts for granting standing. 2 2
Even if EPA approval of the plan would lead to higher emissions,
the injury would be of such a widespread nature that it would fail
to carve out a minority capable of invoking judicial protection.23
Further, EPA approval of a plan is the type of agency decision that
contains a certain amount of political discretion, which is an area
where, according to Scalia, the courts should not intrude.2 Therefore, Centerfor Auto Safety presents for Scalia the type of situation
where a court should not be ready to read a congressional conferral
of standing.2 5
Yet, in his majority opinion, Scalia dismissed the question of standing in a footnote.2 6 He went on to hold that section 207 requires
recall and repair as the only statutory remedy for nonconformity.23
Therefore, he found that the EPA had acted unlawfully in accepting
GM's offset plan.22 8
2 Id. GM's rationale for using this plan was that it would save the company $11.8 million
and would save 1979 vehicle owners $25.8 million in fuel costs, since the originally proposed
remedy would have caused increased fuel consumption. Id.
Id. (citing Motor Vehicle Recalls under the Clean Air Act, 47 Fed. Reg. 38,189 (1982)).
m Centerfor Auto Safety, 747 F.2d at 3 n.2. Under 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (1982), such
petitions for review must be ified directly with the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia.
23 Centerfor Auto Safety, 747 F.2d at 3.
3 See id. at 2-4.

m See Separationof Powers, supra note 106, at 895-96.
21 See Scalia, Rulemaking as Politics,supra note 210 at v. Viewing EPA plan approval as
political discretion is supported by the fact that the approval of state implementation plans
for conforming to natural air quality standards under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7410
(1982), is a discretionary act of the administrator and therefore not subject to the Clean Air
Act's citizen suit provision, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1982). See West Penn Power Co. v. Train, 378
F. Supp. 941, 944 (W.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd, 522 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
947 (1976).
See Separationof Powers, supra note 106, at 886.
n36See Centerfor Auto Safety, 747 F.2d at 3 n.2.
Id. at 6. Scalia admitted that the cited legislative history only indicated what the Administrator may do, not what he was required to do. Id. at 5.
= Id. at 6.
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On the question of standing, Scalia relied on United States v.
Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP).29
In Center for Auto Safety, he found the petitioners' assertion that
they are "concerned about, and breathe, pollutants in the ambient
air" came within the broad grant of standing announced by the
Supreme Court in SCRAP.A° Scalia's statement in Centerfor Auto
Safety on standing thus contrasts sharply with his earlier theoretical
work and his opinions.
Scalia had specifically cited SCRAP in his Separation of Powers
article as an example of where standing had been extended too far.2 1
In fact, Scalia explained in his 1983 article on standing how he
believes standing should restrict courts to their proper role:
If I am correct that the doctrine of standing, as applied to
challenges to governmental action, is an essential means of restricting the courts to their assigned role of protecting minority
rather than majority interests, several consequences follow.
First... it would follow that not all "concrete injury" indirectly
following from governmental action or inaction would be capable
of supporting a congressional conferral of standing. One can
conceive of such a concrete injury so widely shared that a
congressional specification that the statute at issue was meant
to preclude precisely that injury would nevertheless not suffice
to mark out a subgroup of the body politic requiring judicial
protection. For example, allegedly wrongful governmental action
that affects "all who breathe." [sic] There is surely no reason to
believe that an alleged governmental default of such general
impact would not receive fair consideration in the normal political
process. 242
Scalia's opinion in Centerfor Auto Safety departed from the above
quoted language. 243 Not only did Scalia's opinion grant standing for
a group to challenge such a broad action, but he did so by quoting
language from a case that he specifically criticized in his earlier
4
article.2
Scalia did not, however, completely abandon his earlier conservative stance in Centerfor Auto Safety. He did feel compelled to
bring up the issue in Centerfor Auto Safety, which may indicate a
245
certain concern, if not uneasiness, as to whether standing existed.
219 Id.

at 3 n.2.

0

24 Id.
?' Separationof

Powers, supra note 106, at 890.
at 895-96.
24 See Centerfor Auto Safety, 747 F.2d at 3 n.2.
m See id.; see also Separation of Powers, supra note 106, at 895-96.
24 See Centerfor Auto Safety, 747 F.2d at 3 n.2.
242Id.
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Moreover, his use of the phrase, "at least," to explain how plaintiffs'
fell within the purview of SCRAP may have indicated his doubts as
to the standing of the nonprofit organizations.2 6 Yet, the fact remains that he did find standing, not only for the individuals but for
47
the organizations as wellY

Scalia's position in Center for Auto Safety represents a radical
departure from his earlier stated theoretical views in at least two
ways. First, the ease with which he eliminated the standing issue in
Centerfor Auto Safety indicates a judicial readiness to find a congressional grant of standing that Scalia previously criticized. 48 Standing
to review this type of EPA action is subject to the judicial review
provisions of the APA.? 9 Because there is no language in the Clean
Air 2kct that specifically provides review to persons aggrieved or
adversely affected as the Center for Auto Safety plaintiffs were,
then Scalia apparently found standing on the basis of the "transmorgrified" affirmative grant of standing to parties in fact aggrieved
"regardless of a lack of legal right or specific statutory language."' 0
Thus in Centerfor Auto Safety, Scalia followed an interpretation
that he had criticized earlier as a major cause of the current liberalized standing doctrine. 51
The shift in Scalia's position is also clear from his finding in Center
for Auto Safety that the breathing of polluted air is a sufficient injury
in fact to confer standing on the plaintiffs.2 2 Scalia stated in his
earlier article that such an injury was one that the courts should not
recognize because it would receive fair consideration in the majoritarian, democratic processes.m To be consistent with his own article,
he thus would have viewed Centerfor Auto Safety as a case where
the court should avoid protecting majority rights and refrain from
finding a congressional designation of a "minority" group that encompasses the entire population.2 Scalia's decision in Centerfor Auto
Safety, thus, represents a much different stance from his earlier
writings.
216See
27

id.
See id.

m See id.; see also Separation of Powers, supra note 106, at 886.
5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982).
0
- See Separation of Powers, supra note 106, at 889 (quoting Scanwell Laboratories, Inc.
v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1970)).
51 See Separationof Powers, supra note 106, at 889.
2- See Centerfor Auto Safety, 747 F.2d at 3 n.2.
m Separation of Powers, supra note 106, at 896.
24See id.
P9
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Despite the departure from his stated standing theory, the Center
for Auto Safety decision does not represent a shift away from the
basic tenets of Scalia's philosophy of judicial self-restraint. In Center
for Auto Safety, Scalia was still able to restrict the power of the
55
courts by deferring to what he found to be the congressional intent.
The decision also assured that the courts would no longer need to
make policy decisions concerning proper emission reduction plans by
finding that Congress had already decided the proper policy to follow. 5 6 The Center for Auto Safety decision can thus be seen as
reducing the power of the courts by following the interpretation of
a coordinate branch of government.
Nor is Centerfor Auto Safety an isolated result. Scalia reached a
similar, if less dramatic, result in Thomas v. New York. 5 7 The
Thomas decision is interesting more for what Scalia did not do than
for what he did.25 By not addressing certain statutory and constitutional questions, Scalia accepted a much lower injury in fact standard than his theoretical writings indicated he would be willing to
do. Further, the injury in Thomas effects the type of majoritarian
interests that Scalia had earlier indicated were not to be resolved
by the courts.25 9
Thomas arose from a letter sent by Douglas Costle, then Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, to the Secretary
of State, Edmund Muskie. 260 In the letter, Costle indicated that acid
deposition was endangering the United States and Canada and that
sources in both countries contributed to the problem. 261 The issue
on appeal in Thomas was whether, under section 115 of the Clean
Air Act, 262 Administrator Costle's letter legally obligated his successors to identify the states responsible for the acid rain and order
2
those states to abate the responsible emissions. 6
21

See Centerfor Auto Safety, 747 F.2d at 6.

2 See id.
' 802 F.2d 1443 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3196 (1987) (Scalia, J., took no

part in the consideration of the petitions for certiorari).
=SId.

219 See Separation of Powers, supra note 106, at 894-95.
2
60Thomas v. New York, 802 F.2d 443, 1444-45 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
3196 (1987).
26 Id. at 1445.
42 U.S.C. § 7415(a) (1982).

This section provides, in pertinent part:
Whenever the Administrator, upon receipt of reports, surveys or studies from any
duly constituted international agency has reason to believe that any air pollutant or
pollutants emitted in the United States cause or contribute to air pollution which
may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare in a foreign
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Plaintiffs were several eastern states, national environmental
groups, American citizens who owned property in eastern Canada,
and a Congressman. 2 4 In his decision for the majority, Scalia dismissed any question of standing by noting that the plaintiffs were
suing pursuant to the "citizen suit" provision, section 304, of the
Clean Air Act. 265 Section 304 permits any person to bring a civil
action "against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of
the Administrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter
'266
which is not discretionary with the Administrator.

Scalia's position in Thomas appears to be nothing more than a
proper deferral to Congress' ability to confer standing. 261 However,
the issue is not so easily dismissed. Scalia was quite careful to note
in his article that congressional power is not unlimited; Congress
cannot extend standing beyond the core article III requirement of
injury in fact.268 Section 304 is antithetical to Scalia's stated views
regarding a strict standard of injury in fact. In this light, the relevant
question is why, in Thomas, Scalia did not address the constitutional
infirmities of the "citizen suit" provision, or, in lieu of that, limit the
court's grant of standing to only those who had suffered constitutionally sufficient injury, as he defined such injury in his writings. 269
Scalia had the ability to raise such issues sui juris because standing
issues are jurisdictional and must be raised by the court.27 0
There are several explanations why Scalia did not declare the
citizen suit provision's grant of universal standing unconstitutional.
Although there is support for the view that an unlimited grant of
standing is unconstitutional, 271 such a decision runs counter to the
country ... the Administrator shall give formal notification thereof to the Governor
of the State in which such emissions originate.
42 U.S.C. § 7415(a) (1982).
Thomas, 802 F.2d at 1445.
Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2) (1982)).
42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2).
Thomas, 802 F.2d at 1445-46.
2
18Separation of Powers, supra note 106, at 896.
269 Id.

270See Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 954 n.4 (1984). Even
though neither of the parties questioned the state court's conclusion that the plaintiff had
sustained a sufficient injury to establish standing, the Supreme Court stated that
"[nievertheless, because the 'case or controversy' requirement is jurisdictional here, we must
satisfy ourselves that the requirements of Article III are met." See also Regents of University
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 281 n.14 (1978), where the Court stated: "[pletitioner does
not object to Bakke's standing, but inasmuch as this charge concerns our jurisdiction under
Art. III, it must be considered and rejected."
211A number of cases have held that reading the Clean Air Act's "citizen suit" provision as
granting unlimited standing would be unconstitutional. See Mountain States Legal Found. v.
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169

recognized judicial duty to avoid decisions of constitutional questions. 272 Courts recognize that they should thus avoid possible constitutional issues by giving a questionable statute a construction that
avoids such problems. 273 This approach is also in keeping with Scalia's
274
own policy of judicial self-restraint.

Costle, 630 F.2d 754, 767 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1050 (1981); Natural Resources
Defense Council v. Envtl. Protection Agency, 507 F.2d 905, 908-09 (9th Cir. 1974); Natural
Resources Defense Council v. Envtl.'Protection Agency, 481 F.2d 116, 119-21 (10th Cir. 1973).
In the earliest of these cases, Natural Resources Defense Council v. Environmental Protection Agency, 481 F.2d at 118-19, Judge Breitenstein reviewed the standing doctrine in
ruling on the validity of the citizen suit provision. In finding that the section cannot be read
to grant universal standing, Judge Breitenstein used language quite evocative of Scalia's own
analysis of standing.
We further believe that under the doctrine of separation of powers the question of
the validity and extent [of] congressional authorization is for determination by the
judicial branch. Otherwise the provisions of Art. III limiting judicial power to cases
and controversies is thrown into the discard. . . . Unrestricted litigation by private
persons to assert their own ideologies under a claim of public interest presents the
potential of hazardous consequences to our constitutional system based as it is on the
concept of separation of powers.
Id. at 120-21.
Reliance on these cases would have given Scalia a strong opportunity to limit the broad
grants of standing in environmental litigation that he had consistently criticized. See Separation of Powers, supra note 106, at 897; Rulemaking as Politics, supra note 210, at vi.
Moreover, Scalia discussed such limitations on congressional conferrals of standing in Covelo
where he stated: "It is enough to note that if Congress can create an 'injury in fact' by merely
saying that a particular class has a 'right' to have something done, the case or controversy
clause will have been transformed from a constitutional imperative to a statutory option."
Covelo, slip op., dissenting opinion.
Further support for a limited grant of standing is found in McClure v. Carter, 513 F. Supp.
265, 268-71 (D.C. Idaho 1981), aff'd sub nom. McClure v. Reagan, 454 U.S. 1025 (1981),
which held that despite a statute purporting to allow any member of Congress to challenge a
judge's appointment, a senator did not have standing to make such a judicial challenge in
either his individual or official capacity. Id. at 271.
An additional argument for eliminating a universal grant of standing would also come from
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803), which stated that "a law repugnant
to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that
instrument." Marbury also established that it is the province of the courts to decide the issue
of constitutionality. Id. at 176. Given Scalia's past reliance on Marburyon the issue of standing,
such an approach seems natural to expect in Scalia's discussion of the congressional grant of
standing here. See Separation of Powers, supra note 106, at 883.
For further discussion of citizen suit provisions, see also Currie, JudicialReview Under
Federal PollutionLaws, 62 IowA L. REV. 1221, 1276-79 (1977) (discussing the constitutional
implications of universal standing provision of the Clean Air Act).
Professor Berger provides a contrary analysis of the article III issue. See Berger, Standing
to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816 (1969).
Professor Berger uses an historical analysis to refute the notion that standing is grounded in
requirements of injury in fact and separation of powers. Id.
2 See Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 568-74 (1947).
21 See id. at 569.
274
See J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 87 (1986).
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Consequently, to avoid the constitutional question in Thomas,
Scalia must have given section 304 a construction that required an
injury sufficient to meet article 111.275 Such a construction is consistent with that given by the District Court. 276 The District Court
found that litigants suing under section 304 may only vindicate their
claim if they met the constitutional requirements of article 111.277
Because the Court of Appeals disposed of the standing question
in such a cursory manner, it is arguable that Scalia not only accepted
the lower court's reading of the statute, but also implicitly accepted
their finding of injury in fact. If this is correct, Scalia accepted a
finding of standing based on acid deposition, an injury not only
majoritarian but also an injury whose redressability is questionable. 278 Even if he did not tacitly accept this theory, Scalia still accepted a much lower -standard of injury in fact than one might have
thought based on his earlier stated theoretical views. 279 The only
other possible injury to the plaintiffs was the agency's failure to
impose a requirement on the states.2 0 This is important because
Scalia had also specifically criticized this type of third party injury
in his standing article. 81 Thus, either possible basis for standing in
Thomas departs significantly from the strict, nonmajoritarian stance
Scalia had previously espoused.
The results of both Center for Auto Safety v. Ruckelshaus and
Thomas v. New York could lead to the conclusion that Scalia may
not necessarily impose his strict view of standing onto environmental
litigation. 28 2 This conclusion can also be bolstered by Scalia's dissenting opinion in Center for Auto Safety v. National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration s (NHTSA). In NHTSA, the same
organization as in Ruckelshaus and additional plaintiffs filed a peti-

z

5 See Thomas, 802 F.2d at 1445-46.
See New York v. Thomas, 613 F. Supp. 1472, 1479-80 (D.D.C. 1985).

27 See id.; see also Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25, 33 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977); Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 602 F. Supp. 892, 896-97 (N.D. Cal.
1984); Friends of the Earth v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 419 F. Supp. 528, 530 (D.D.C. 1976).
But see Metropolitan Washington Coalition for Clean Air v. District of Columbia, 511 F.2d
809, 814 n.26 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (citizens organization had standing to sue under section 304
without alleging an injury in fact).
27 See New York v. Thomas, 613 F. Supp. at 1479-81.
2 See Thomas, 802 F.2d at 1445-46; see also Separation of Powers, supra note 106, at
881-82.
28See Thomas, 802 F.2d at 1446.
281 See Separationof Powers, supra note 106, at 894.
2
2 See supra text accompanying notes 107-72.
28 See 793 F.2d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also In re Center for Auto
Safety, 793 F.2d 1346 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (companion case).
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tion challenging the validity of a National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration rule amending its previously published fuel economy
standards for light trucks for the 1985 model year, and establishing
light truck standards for the 1986 model year. 284 Petitioners were
organizations that worked to promote energy conservation. 28 They
sought standing as representatives of their members. 286 They alleged
that their members were injured because of their interest in purchasing the most fuel-efficient vehicles possible. 287
The government countered that the petitioners lacked standing
because their claims of injury were nothing more than generalized
grievances shared by many people and were thus insufficient to
establish standing. In characterizing the government's argument
as "completely misplaced," 289 the majority stated that "[tihe question
of how many suffer from an injury is logically unrelated to the
question of whether there is an injury and has nothing'290to do at all
with the fitness of a particular party to bring a claim.

In addition, the majority in NHTSA found that the applicable
statute 291 granted review to those adversely affected, and thus removed the court's ability to erect prudential barriers.292 In such
cases, the court stated, "it matters not one iota if a large number of
people share the injury and would benefit from its redress. The
courts may appropriately function as the guardians of majority interests, without weakening the separation of powers, when Congress
has decided to grant them that role.

'293

281 Centerfor Auto Safety v. NHTSA, 793 F.2d at 1323. The other groups were Environmental Policy Institute, Public Citizen, and Union of Concerned Scientists. Id. at 1323 n.3.
=Id. at 1323.
2
Id. at 1324.
27Id.
at 1332. Petitioners base this injury on the following claimed results of the NHTSA's
action:
NHTSA's low CAFE standards will diminish the types of fuel-efficient vehicles and
options available. Without the threat of civil penalties, manufacturers will not be
prodded to install as many fuel-saving devices, nor to install them as promptly. As a
result, petitioners' members will have less opportunity to purchase fuel-efficient light
trucks than would otherwise be available to them. In addition, the petitioners urge
that NHTSA's action sends an instant message that standards will be altered to
accommodate manufacturers' marketing plans. Such a message can only retard the
current development of new technologies that would make even greater fuel savings
possible in the future.
Id.
as Id. at 1333.

m Id. at 1333-34.

m Id. at 1334.
15 U.S.C. § 2002(b) (1982).
2 Centerfor Auto Safety v. NHTSA, 793 F.2d at 1337.
29

23
M

Id.
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In his dissent to NHTSA, Scalia characterized the majority opinion
as violating separation of powers because it was "not judicial vindication of private rights, but judicial infringement upon the people's
prerogative to have their elected representatives determine how
laws that do not bear upon private rights shall be applied. ''2 4 Therefore, Scalia concluded that the plaintiffs' alleged injury was "of interest only to the society at large, and should be resolved through
the political mechanisms by which that society acts. There is no basis
for believing that these plaintiffs have suffered the personal hurt
that alone justifies judicial interference with the execution of the
laws." 29 5 In contrast to his environmental opinions, in NHTSA Scalia
resurrected his earlier strict interpretation of standing as an essential element of separation of powers, and as a method of restricting
the courts' power over the other branches of government. 29 6 Apparently, Scalia was only willing to adopt the liberal view of standing
where it had been specifically required by Supreme Court precedents. He applied his stricter view of standing, however, to all other
areas. Scalia thus seemed to be trying to limit the spread of the
liberal standing doctrine as much as possible.
V. JUSTICE SCALIA'S IMPACT ON FUTURE ENVIRONMENTAL
LITIGATION

Scalia's divergent positions as to standing in environmental cases
versus non-environmental cases cannot be attributed to merely a
pro-environmental viewpoint. Such a conclusion is unjustified because Scalia's record on the Court of Appeals is uneven; he has
joined with majority panels in decisions that can be viewed as antienvironmental. 29 7 The most prominent of these was Thomas v. New
2

Id. at 1342.

Id. at 1345.
See Separationof Powers, supranote 106, at 894-97.
2 See California v. Watt, 19 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1281 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Interior Department oil and gas leasing plan does not have to institute a schedule for determining if the
proposal is consistent with state coastal management plan); Montgomery Envtl. Coalition,
Inc. v. Envtl. Protection Agency, 19 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (not
designated for publication) (court lacks jurisdiction to review EPA order allowing a sewage
treatment plant to discharge higher levels of pollutants than allowed by plant's discharge
permit). But see Natural Resources Defense Council v. Envtl. Protection Agency, 20 Env't
Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1264 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (the EPA can consider emissions from dockside
stationary activities when setting standards under the Clean Air Act for marine terminals);
Sierra Club v. Peterson, 19 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1705 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Interior Department
violated NEPA by failing to perform an adequate review of the environmental consequences
caused by issuing oil and gas leases for two National Forests).
2_
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York, 298 where he held that the EPA's failure to take action concerning acid deposition was unreviewable because Administrator
Costle's letter to Secretary of State Muskie did not constitute a valid
rulemaking because there were no notice-and-comment proce29 9
dures.
These divergent results indicate that, to properly determine
whether Scalia will adhere to the lesser showing of injury required
for standing in environmental litigation, it is necessary first to determine if other factors influenced Scalia's more liberal positions on
standing in Centerfor Auto Safety v. Ruckelshaus and Thomas v.
New York.3 0 Moreover, it must also be determined how these factors
may have influenced the divergent results on the merits, that is, a
pro-environmental result in Center for Auto Safety301 and an antienvironmental result in Thomas. 302 The key to understanding these
apparent inconsistencies seems to lie in the overall jurisprudential
philosophy that Scalia brings to his decisionmaking.
A. FactorsInfluencing Justice Scalia's Decisionmaking
A realistic assessment of the judicial process must recognize that
an important component of any judge's decisionmaking is the overall
jurisprudential philosophy to which that judge adheres. This is especially true where the case being decided involves no statutory or
common-law commands that call for a specific result. 0 3 A judge thus
cannot decide the case merely by reference to the will of the legislature or an agency. 3° 4 In such wide open cases, judges are able to

inject into their decisionmaking value preferences that derive from
their own jurisprudential philosophy.
One fertile area for these wide open cases is constitutional law. In
interpreting the broad phrases of the Constitution, Justices are almost compelled to apply their own value preferences. °5 Additionally,

=' 802 F.2d

1443 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
Id. at 1446-47
m See supra text accompanying notes 218-81.
301See 747 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
m See 802 F.2d 1443 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
See R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 198-207 (1985).
sw Id. at 206-07.
305Felix Frankfurter once wrote that many constitutional concepts were "vague or purposely
ambiguous" and "that questions of more-or-less, of matters of degree and appraisals of policy
necessarily come into play and control the controversy." He then stated that:
Thus, in construing the Constitution in these vital controversies, the Supreme Court
does not go to a dark room and by a process of nature develop the constitutional
photographic negative into the picture of its decision. The Court is engaged in a
2"
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with the rise of decisions that are less and less anchored to the actual
text of the Constitution, this 30
type
of value-laden decisionmaking has
6
become even more prevalent.

Both standing and environmental law are such wide open areas.
Standing, as has been described in this note, has long been an area
where value-laden decisionmaking has thrived. 30 7 This value-laden
decisionmaking has led to a wide range of decisions with very few
areas that are bound by specific and consistent precedents. 38 As for
environmental law, it can be argued that the pervasive environmental legislation of the last twenty years predominantly controls environmental law. It is important to recognize, however, that Scalia
believes otherwise. That is, he believes that the recent promotion
of environmental interests is a direct result of the judiciary's value
preferences for those interests. 309 Consequently, standing and environmental law are sufficiently wide open so that Scalia should be
able to address his value preferences when deciding such issues that
come before the Supreme Court.
Even if standing and environmental law are not viewed as wide
open, a reasonable analysis of the judicial process recognizes that
any decision has elements of a judge's personal values.3 10 As Judgelater Justice-Benjamin Cardozo stated, a judge "must balance all
his ingredients, his philosophy, his logic, his analogies, his history,
his customs, his sense of right, and all the rest, and adding a little
here and taking out a little there, must determine, as wisely as he
creative act-it must exercise judgment. And into the totality of its judgment enters
the whole of the experience, the imagination, the forecast of the future, the fears
and hopes, of the members of the Court.
FELIX FRANKFURTER ON THE SUPREME COURT 336-37 (P. Kurland ed. 1970).
'0 See R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 202 (1985). Just because values enter the decisionmaking does not mean that anything goes. Professor Tribe noted these limitations when
he observed that his long study of constitutional law had convinced him that "constitutional
interpretation is a practice alive with choice but laden with content; and that this practice has
both boundaries and moral significance not wholly reducible to, although never independent
of, the ends for which it is deployed." L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 4 (1985).
mo'
See Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envt'l Study
Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
m' Environmental law is one of those few areas that seem to follow a specific and identifiable
trend. In environmental litigation, that trend is toward a more liberal approach to standing
issues, with only a requirement of very minimal injuries. See supra, text accompanying notes
69-103.
"o See Separation of Powers, supra note 106, at 896-97.
0
31

See K. LLEWELLYN, THE COVMsON LAW TRADITION 217-22 (1960). Llewellyn was one

of the leaders of the Legal Realism movement. He described Legal Realism as a method of
inquiry rather than a philosophy. The only tenet of the method is to look at the legal process
from a fresh perspective to see how it really works. Id. at 510.
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can, which weight shall tip the scales. '3 11 Therefore, even in cases
where there is very little room for judicial maneuvering, judges will,
in some part, inject their own values into their decisionmaking. If
nothing else, judges, being only human, will necessarily interpret
facts based on their own world views. The relevant inquiry in analyzing Scalia thus becomes one of determining the jurisprudential
philosophy that he will bring to his decisionmaldng on the Supreme
Court.
Scalia's overarching philosophy is judicial self-restraint. 1 2 The
prime goal of this philosophy is a reduction in the perceived overjudicialization of government.3 13 A self-restrained judge will thus
seek to limit judicial power over other governmental institutions by
paying greater deference to congressional and administrative decisions. 314 This deference can be achieved either by deferring on the
actual merits of the case 315 or by invoking stricter standards for
3 16
judicial review, as Scalia suggests in his 1983 article on standing.
By starting from the premise that Scalia will approach cases from
the perspective of judicial self-restraint, it will be possible to return
to an analysis of Scalia's Court of Appeals decisions to explain their
results and to determine what effect Scalia may have on environmental litigation.
B. JudicialRestraintAnalysis of Justice Scalia's Decisionmaking
One reason for supposing that an inquiry into Scalia's value preferences will help explain his opinions and will yield reliable predictions of his future position on environmental issues lies in a recognition that Scalia has already used the standing doctrine as a method
to dispose of the merits of particular cases. In other words, Scalia
has allowed his view of the merits to dictate his conclusions as to
317
whether the standing requirements have been met.
This type of value-laden decisionmaking provides a reasonable
explanation, in part, for the lack of concern that Scalia expressed
311

B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 162 (1921).

3,2 See Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, The D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978
SuP. CT. REv. 345, 382; Chief Justice Burger to Retire From Supreme Court; Reagan
Nominates Rehnquist as Successor, Scalia to Fill Vacancy, 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) at 217
(June 6, 1986).
13

3 R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 208 (1985).
314

Id.

315See Center for Auto Safety v. Ruckelshaus,
316See Separationof Powers, supra note 106.
317

747 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

See L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 100 (1985).
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for the standing problems in Center for Auto Safety v. Ruckelshaus.318 By strictly enforcing what he asserted was the legislative
mandate, Scalia was able to promote his own preference for judicial
self-restraint by deferring to congressional intent 319 and by encouraging more specific legislative delegations to agencies.32 ° In addition,
321
by mandating that the only proper remedy was recall and repair,
Scalia was ensuring that the EPA would only approve such plans
and thus ensuring that the courts would no longer be asked to decide
this policy issue. Centerfor Auto Safety consequently restricted the
courts' power. Such values bind the particular agency, as well as the
court, and place policy making power in the most majoritarian governmental body. For these reasons, it is possible that in Centerfor
Auto Safety Scalia was willing to subvert his otherwise strict view
of the standing requirements. Arriving at a "pro-environmental"
decision can thus be seen as incidental to Scalia; in Centerfor Auto
Safety it was merely a byproduct of achieving the goals of his judicial
agenda.
Avoiding application of strict standing requirements in Centerfor
Auto Safety also made sense from a practical standpoint. Scalia was
faced with a specific precedent-SCRAP-which granted standing
for an injury to the air the plaintiffs breathed. 32 Consequently, it
would have been quite difficult for Scalia to distinguish the injury in
Centerfor Auto Safety from the injury in SCRAP. Moreover, even
if he were successful in such a task, he faced a great likelihood of
being overturned if the Supreme Court granted certiorari. The decision in Center for Auto Safety can thus be explained on both
practical and theoretical levels.
The same value preferences and judicial practicalities also help
explain the result of Thomas v. New York. 32 Thomas can be viewed
as a value-laden decision because Scalia lessened his requirements
of standing to address directly the underlying issue of the role the
court should play in what he viewed as an act of political discretion,
that is, the agency's failure to take action on acid deposition.3
318See 747 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1984). See supra text accompanying notes 221-56.
319 See Centerfor Auto Safety, 747 F.2d at 5.
32 See id. at 5-6; 1976 Bicentennial Institute-Oversight and Review of Agency Decisionmaking, 28 ADMIN. L. REV. 569, 694-95, 701 (1976).

Centerfor Auto Safety, 747 F.2d at 6.
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412
U.S. 669, 687 (1973).
802 F.2d 1443 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
"4 See id. at 1448; Rulemaking as Politics, supra note 210, at v.
321
32
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Because dispensing of Thomas on standing requirements would have
been adverse to the congressional intent of the "citizen suit" provision of the Clean Air Act, 325 such a decision would have faced a
strong likelihood of reversal. By finding in Thomas that Administrator Costle's letter was an unreviewable act, Scalia was still able to
restrict the courts' power in relation to the other branches of government and thus promote his judicial agenda.
The results in the non-environmental cases, Covelo 326 and Center
for Auto Safety v. NHTSA, 327 can also be explained by reference to
both Scalia's theoretical views and the practicalities of judicial decisionmaking. In these cases, Scalia could more easily assert his
preferences for reducing the judiciary's power by restricting access
to it. He was not faced with specifically applicable precedents liberally granting standing as he was in the environmental area. Scalia
could thus pick and choose among the widely divergent standing
cases to find support for his strict standing interpretation. 328 Consequently, it was the confused nature of the standing doctrine that
allowed Scalia to strictly construe standing in Covelo and Centerfor
Auto Safety v. NHTSA.
The results of these cases indicate a number of possibilities for
standing in future environmental litigation and for environmental
litigation in general. Although Scalia was willing to defer to the
liberal grants of standing accorded to environmental litigation, it
seems possible that such deference could change on the Supreme
Court. Appellate courts have a dual function of correcting error and
of setting forth principles of law to guide the lower courts 29 Although some have argued that intermediate appellate courts do, and
should, have a major lawmaking function,3 0 Scalia has said that
intermediate appellate courts should take a more restricted approach
to making new law.331 Such constraints may not occur on the Su42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2) (1982).
No. 82-2377, 82-2417, slip op. (D.C. Cir. Dec. 21, 1982) (LEXIS, Genfed library, USAPP
ifie) (per curiam, Scalia, J., dissenting). See supra text accompanying notes 175-217.
= 793 F.2d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1986). See supra text accompanying notes 283-96.
328Among the cases Scalia cites in Covelo are Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org.,
426 U.S. 26 (1976), and Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). In Centerfor Auto Safety v.
NHTSA, Scalia relied on such strict standing cases as Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95
(1983).
'2 Leonard, The CorrectnessFunction of Appellate Decision-Making:Judicial Obligation
in an Era of Fragmentation,17 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 299, 302 (1984).
0 See Grey, IntermediateJudicial Creativity, TRIAL, April, 1985, at 26; Kaplan, Do Intermediate Appellate Courts Have a Lawmaking Function?, 70 MAss. L. REv. 10 (1985).
321
See Vermont Yankee: The APA, The D.C. Circuit,and the Supreme Court, supra note
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preme Court since the pull of precedent will be much weaker there
than on the Court of Appeals. This view is further bolstered by the
fact that most adherents of judicial self-restraint consider deference
to precedent as a completely separate phenomenon, unrelated to the
goals of self-restraint.3 32 Their exclusivity seems correct because the
proponents of judicial self-restraint see their goal as reducing the
judiciary's power in relation to the other branches of government
33
and not in relation to activist courts of the past.
Consequently, Scalia may push for his stricter standing requirements in environmental litigation. It is difficult to determine whether
he will be able to garner enough support to carry out his views.334
What seems more certain is that Scalia will likely advocate a decrease in what he views as the Supreme Court's promotion of environmental interests based on the Justices' own socioeconomic prejudices. 35 Therefore, if Scalia is unable to get the votes necessary to
restrict judicial review by tightening up the standing requirements,
he may still try to defer to decisions made by Congress or the
3 6
agencies as he did in Centerfor Auto Safety v. Ruckelshaus.A
This approach does not necessarily doom all environmental interests. Strict adherence to a self-restrained judicial approach will also
produce some pro-environmental decisions if such policies are clearly
enunciated by Congress and the current administration. 3 7 It may
thus ultimately be the future political importance of environmental
issues that dictates Justice Scalia's positions in environmental cases.
VI. CONCLUSION

The divergent results of Scalia's Court of Appeals decisions on
standing make it somewhat unlikely that on the Supreme Court
312, at 359-75 (criticizing the lower court's role in the creation of hybrid rulemaking procedures).
See R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 210 (1985).

= Id. at 208.
"3 In Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 740 (1984), Justice O'Connor wrote an opinion joined
by Burger, C.J., and White, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., denying standing to a group that
sought to have IRS standards for denying tax exempt status to racially discriminatory private
schools changed. In arriving at that holding, the Supreme Court stated that standing requirements must be interpreted by reference to separation of powers principles. Id. at 752.
Professor Nichol sees the Court's emphasis on separation of powers principles as possibly
portending a major restriction on judicial access in order to achieve deference to the other
branches of government. Nichol, Abusing Standing:A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U.
PA. L. REv. 635, 636 (1985). This analysis suggests that Scalia may have some support for
his standing theories.
= See Separation of Powers, supra note 106, at 896-97.
= See 747 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1984). See supra text accompanying notes 221-54.
337

See R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL CouRTs 208-09 (1985).
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Scalia will advocate a hard and fast rule of standing inimical to
environmental interests. That same divergence, however, indicates
that Scalia is willing to let his view of the merits dictate the result
of the standing question. Thus, based on his past decisions, when
not bound-by-specific congressional or administrative directives,
Scalia will most likely seek to promote the philosophy of judicial selfrestraiht by cutting back the Court's potentially powerful role in
promoting the environmental agenda.

